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Introduction 
Achieving more fiscal discipline has been at 
the top of the political agenda ever since 
financial markets started to question the 
sustainability of public finances in the 
eurozone. In an attempt to show the 
eurozone’s resolve, EU leaders have agreed 
to adopt an Intergovernmental Treaty. This 
Treaty is likely to lead to major changes in 
the eurozone’s fiscal rules. 
Prior to the sovereign debt crisis, the EU did 
not wish to intervene too much in Member 
States’ national fiscal legislation, as this was 
seen as contrary to the subsidiarity principle. 
The eurozone sovereign debt crisis has 
overturned this reasoning and has led to calls 
for more national ownership. The 
Intergovernmental Treaty will indeed result 
in an important step-up in the EU’s 
interference in national fiscal rules. It will 
most notably require participating eurozone 
countries to adopt a so-called Golden Rule. 
This paper provides a comparison between 
the Golden Rule and existing EU fiscal 
norms (i.e. the 3% deficit ceiling, the 
Medium-Term Objective and the Debt-
reduction Rule). The paper first zooms in on 
the future national Golden Rule. Then, the 
Golden Rule is compared to the three 
European level fiscal norms. Based on this 
If introduced successfully, national 
Golden Rules will completely 
overturn fiscal governance in the 
eurozone. Golden Rules would 
almost always be more stringent 
than EU-level fiscal norms. EU 
fiscal norms will hence evolve into 
a safety net in case a Golden Rule 
fails. The possibility of such a 
failure is, indeed, not to be 
dismissed. Because of the severity 
of the Golden Rules, eurozone 
leaders should reflect on their 
design. There is a real risk that 
they will undercut public 
investment, which would be at the 
cost of the EU’s other long-term 
challenges. 
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comparison, we describe how EU fiscal 
norms’ role will evolve from a normative role 
in into that of a safety net for the national 
Golden Rules. Before drawing a conclusion, 
the paper considers the stringency of the 
Golden Rule, which could prove problematic 
in the future. 
1. The Golden Rule  
At the European Summit of December 2011, 
eurozone leaders agreed to sign the new 
Intergovernmental Treaty by March of the 
following year. One of the few major 
innovations of the Treaty is that it will 
require participating eurozone countries to 
introduce a so-called Golden Rule at the 
national level1. Other participating Member 
States can adopt such a rule on a voluntary 
basis. Non-eurozone countries are hence only 
subject to EU norms, unless they themselves 
decide otherwise. 
Putting in place Golden Rules is mainly 
meant as a short-term signal to financial 
markets. The Golden Rules are to underline 
the eurozone leaders’ resolve to pursue 
prudent future fiscal policies, which was 
often not the case before. At their December 
meeting, the eurozone leaders already laid 
down the Golden Rule’s basic framework. 
On the one hand, they agreed on the main 
content of the rule. The Golden Rule is 
defined as a structural deficit of 0.5% of 
GDP or less. It is important to indicate that 
this does not correspond with the traditional 
meaning of a fiscal Golden Rule, i.e. deficits 
can only be used to finance investments that 
are to the benefit of future generations2. 
                                                 
1 European Council, Statement by the Euro Area 
Heads of State or Government, 9 December 2011. 
2 ARTIS, M., 2002, “The Stability and Growth Pact: 
Fiscal Policy in the EMU”. In BREUSS, F., FINK, 
While the structural deficit concept is not 
without difficulties, it refers to over-the-cycle 
deficits. The structural deficit concept tries to 
filter out temporary fiscal measures, as well as 
fiscal evolutions that are purely due to 
cyclical changes in the economy. This implies 
that the structural fiscal position of a 
Member State will typically be better than the 
actual fiscal position in case of economic 
downturns, and worse in case of economic 
upturns.  
More precise requirements and exceptions to 
the Golden Rule will be included in the 
Intergovernmental Treaty. A draft version of 
the Treaty states that the normal Golden 
Rule does not apply to countries with a debt 
level “significantly below” 60% of GDP, 
although this threshold is not defined more 
precisely. Instead, eurozone countries with 
debt significantly below 60% of GDP would 
be allowed to have a maximum structural 
deficit of 1%. 
As most eurozone countries currently have 
deficits levels well above the Golden Rule, 
the draft Treaty allows for a transition period. 
During this period, countries are allowed to 
converge gradually, but rapidly, towards the 
deficit target. 
Another important nuance to the Golden 
Rule is that it may temporarily be disregarded 
in case of economic downturns that go 
beyond normal cyclical evolutions, or in case 
of other major unforeseen events. Such 
exceptions could allow Member States to 
dilute the Golden Rule (see infra). 
Besides the content of the Rule, eurozone 
leaders agreed on the Golden Rule’s legal 
                                                                        
G. and GRILLER, S. (eds.), Institutional, Legal and 
Economic Aspects of the EMU. Wien: Springer, 
101-116. 
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form. Preferably, the Golden Rule is to be 
introduced in Member States’ constitutions3. 
This binding and even constitutional nature 
of the Golden Rule is to ensure that it is 
effectively applied by the Member States. As 
former Belgian Prime Minister Leo 
Tindemans famously stated: “The constitution is 
not some scrap of paper4”. 
2. EU fiscal norms will be 
overshadowed by the Golden Rule  
The Golden Rule comes in addition to the 
existing EU fiscal rules. These EU-level rules 
essentially comprise three norms: the 3% 
deficit-to-GDP ceiling, the Medium-term 
Budgetary Objective (MTO) and the Debt-
reduction Rule. In comparing these norms 
with the Golden Rule, it becomes clear that 
the latter will impose significantly stricter 
fiscal rigour than is required by EU-level 
norms. 
2.1. The 3% deficit ceiling 
The 3% deficit ceiling was introduced by the 
Maastricht Treaty. The norm indicates that, 
in principle, Member States cannot have an 
annual public deficit-to-GDP ratio of more 
than 3%. Because it was the clearest and 
most explicit, the 3% deficit ceiling has been 
the prime fiscal norm prior to the sovereign 
debt crisis. 
To a large extent, this focus on the 3% deficit 
limit was detrimental to other fiscal rules. 
Indeed, the 60% debt-to-GDP limit and the 
Medium-Term Budgetary Objective (see 
infra) would, in many cases, have required 
                                                 
3 The draft versions of the Treaty are less 
demanding than the December Declaration by 
eurozone leaders. The latter required the Golden 
Rules to be at the constitutional or equivalent level. 
4 Remarks by Leo Tindemans in the Belgian 
Parliament, 11 October 1978. 
much more prudent fiscal policies by the 
Member States. However, both of these fiscal 
norms were left largely unapplied. 
If the Golden Rule is effectively put into 
practice, the 3% ceiling will play a very 
different role. Instead of avoiding deficits 
surpassing 3% of GDP in difficult times, 
Member States would be forced to have 
quasi-balanced budgets in normal times. Such 
smaller deficits would render it much less 
likely that a deficit of more than 3% is 
reached during economic downturns5. If the 
3% ceiling would nonetheless be reached due 
to a recession, EU legislation permits the 
deficit ceiling to be exceeded temporarily. So 
the 3% ceiling will only apply in case of a 
considerable economic downturn that is not 
a recession. In any case, due to the Golden 
Rule, the relevance of the 3% ceiling will 
decrease considerably. 
2.2. The Medium-term Budgetary 
Objective 
The Golden Rule is in fact very similar to the 
existing Medium-term Budgetary Objective. 
This EU norm also requires over-the-cycle 
budgets to be close to balance or in surplus6. 
The 2005 revision of the Stability Pact 
allowed for differentiated medium-term 
objectives, which can range from a budget 
deficit of 1% of GDP to a budget in surplus. 
Similar to the Golden Rule, exceptional 
circumstances can allow for a temporary 
deviation from the MTO. 
For countries with debt significantly below 
60% of GDP, the Golden Rule would be as 
                                                 
5 BUTI, M., SAPIR, A. (eds.), 1998, Economic 
Policy in EMU: A Study by the European 
Commission Services. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
6 Article 2a of Regulation 1466/97 (consolidated 
version). 
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restrictive as the MTO. For the other 
eurozone countries, it is clear that the Golden 
Rule is stricter than the MTO. It imposes a 
maximum structural deficit of 0.5% of GDP, 
instead of 1% provided for in the EU norm. 
In practice, future MTOs will have to be in 
line with the 0.5% limit imposed by the 
Golden Rule. Eurozone countries could still 
decide to commit to an even stricter over-
the-cycle budget deficit. However, this is not 
likely to happen often, as 0.5% is already a 
remarkably far-reaching commitment. 
2.3. The Debt-reduction Rule 
The Maastricht Treaty stipulated that 
countries with debt above 60% of GDP 
should reduce their debt level at a sufficient 
pace. However, as this requirement has never 
been defined more precisely, it has been of 
little relevance. Hence, the Debt-reduction 
Rule that was incorporated in the November 
2011 six-pack on economic governance was 
seen as an important achievement that made 
the Treaty’s debt requirement operational 
after all7. 
The Rule’s content 
The Debt-reduction Rule is a numerical rule 
that determines the required pace of debt-to-
GDP reduction for countries whose debt 
exceeds 60% of GDP. The rule stipulates 
that these Member States have to reduce the 
difference between their debt level and the 
60% debt target by 1/20th per year on 
average.  
In practice, a country with a debt-to-GDP 
level of 70% will thus have to reduce its debt 
to 69.5% of GDP by the next year; a country 
with a 100% debt-to-GDP would have to cut 
                                                 
7 See: Article 2(1a) of Council Regulation No 
1467/97 (consolidated version). 
its debt to 98% of GDP8. To take into 
account yearly fluctuations, debt reduction is 
measured on a three-year basis. The Debt-
reduction Rule hence constitutes a medium-
term norm, like the MTO and the Golden 
Rule. 
This numerical rule is not an automatic one, 
as certain exceptions can be invoked to allow 
a less strict application. These exceptions 
notably include a cyclical slowdown of 
economic activity. Other reasons for 
deviating from the rule concern the medium-
term economic position (e.g. potential 
growth) and budgetary indicators (such as the 
primary balance and adjustment to the 
MTO)9. 
Comparison with the Golden Rule 
When the original Stability and Growth Pact 
was designed, introducing an operational 
debt-reduction requirement was already 
considered. However, such a rule was not 
adopted. Partly, this was due to political 
difficulties, but the introduction of the MTO 
(see supra) also played a role. Applying a 
medium-term objective was expected to 
make a debt-reduction rule redundant10. 
Indeed, there is an overlap in reducing the 
debt-to-GDP level and restraining fiscal 
deficits. As a consequence, there is also a 
close relation between the Debt-reduction 
Rule and the Golden Rule. 
                                                 
8 For 70% debt-to-GDP: (70-60)/20=0.5.; for 
100% debt-to-GDP: (100-60)20=2. 
9 See Recital 13 and 14 and Article 1(2)(b) last 
paragraph of Council Regulation No 1177/2011. 
10 COSTELLO, D., 2001, “The SGP: How Did We 
Get There?”. In BRUNILA, A., BUTI, M. and 
FRANCO, D. (ed.), The Stability and Growth Pact 
- The Architecture of Fiscal Policy in EMU. New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
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Before comparing the two rules in detail, it is 
useful to note that eurozone countries with 
debt-to-GDP levels below 60% constitute a 
particular case. The Debt-reduction Rule 
does not apply to these countries. This is 
different for the Golden Rule, as it will apply 
to all countries whose debt is not significantly 
below the 60% GDP threshold. For such 
countries, the Golden Rule would therefore 
be more relevant than the Debt-reduction 
Rule in any case. 
For countries with debt above 60% of GDP, 
a comparison is less straightforward. The 
essential difference between the Debt-
reduction Rule and the Golden Rule is that 
the former is based on the debt-to-GDP 
level, while the latter concerns the deficit-to-
GDP. Yet, both are influenced by a country’s 
GDP and thus its GDP growth. In fact, 
given a specific debt-to-GDP level, the 
economic growth of a country will determine 
whether it is subject to either the Debt-
reduction Rule or the Golden Rule. On the 
basis of this finding, we can calculate which  
of the two rules is more stringent in specific 
circumstances11. The results are shown in 
Figure 1. 
It is important to bear in mind that growth in 
Figure 1 concerns nominal growth. Nominal 
growth includes both real growth and price 
evolutions12. It is thus typically higher than 
real economic growth. During the period 
2000-2010, the average yearly price increase 
was 1.8%13. Given that level of price increase, 
2% real economic growth equals a nominal 
growth of 3.9%14. 
                                                 
11 See the technical annex available on our website. 
12 Price evolutions in GDP are measured using the 
GDP deflator, which measures price evolutions of 
products and services produced in a country. It is 
closely linked to the concept of inflation, although 
the latter measures price evolutions of products and 
services that are consumed (not necessarily 
produced) in a given country. 
13 Measured by GDP deflator. Source: Ameco 
database and own calculations. 
14 Low nominal growth would normally be due to 
low real economic growth, as the ECB will 
intervene to keep inflation below, but close to, 2%. 
Source: own calculations 
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For a given nominal growth rate, the curve in 
Figure 1 indicates at what level of debt-to-
GDP the Golden Rule and the Debt-
reduction Rule are equally restrictive (that is, 
when both require a deficit of maximum 
0.5% of GDP). Any point above the curve 
signals a situation in which the Debt-
reduction Rule is more stringent than the 
Golden Rule. For countries that are situated 
below the curve, the Golden Rule will be 
more restrictive. In theory, the Debt-
reduction Rule can thus apply if a country 
suffers from high debt and/or low growth. 
In practice, this is very unlikely. 
The Golden Rule is more stringent in almost 
all economic circumstances. Even for 
countries with debt-to-GDP of 100%, 
nominal economic growth needs to fall 
below 2.6% in order for the Debt-reduction 
Rule to be more stringent than the Golden 
Rule. Given an average price increase of 
1.8%, a nominal growth of 2.6% implies only 
0.7% of real economic growth15. 
The past shows that nominal growth only 
falls below 2.6 per cent in extraordinary 
circumstances. In the period 1992-2008, 
average yearly nominal GDP growth has 
been 3.9% in the eurozone16. Nominal 
growth has only fallen below 2.6% of GDP 
in some eurozone countries at the peak of 
economic slowdowns. Such peaks, 
furthermore, are brief. As the Golden Rule 
and the Debt-reduction Rule apply to the 
medium-term, such temporary peaks are not 
taken into account. For both rules, low 
                                                 
15 With higher price increases, or lower debt (most 
often the case), the tipping point is even lower. It 
would then become even more unlikely that the 
Debt-reduction rule would be more stringent than 
the Golden Rule. 
16 Figures are for the initial twelve eurozone 
countries. 
growth only becomes relevant over a period 
of more than three years17.  
In the period 1992-2008, only two eurozone 
countries experienced a prolonged period 
during which average nominal growth stayed 
below 2.6%. Firstly, Finland underwent a 
harsh recession in the early 1990s18. 
However, because such a period can qualify 
as a (severe) cyclical downturn, the Debt-
reduction Rule would not have applied. 
Hence, the rule would not have been more 
stringent than the Golden Rule. The same 
would have been true for the deficits that 
occurred after the economic crisis of 2009. 
Germany is the second country that suffered 
from sustained low growth in the period 
1992-2008. The country suffered from 
almost a decade of low growth: between 1996 
and 2005, average nominal growth was only 
1.9 per cent. Germany’s unification definitely 
played a significant role, which makes this 
country a particular case. Even so, in line 
with the Stability and Growth Pact, the Debt-
reduction Rule would most likely not have 
been enforced in a strict sense during such a 
protracted period of remarkably sluggish 
economic growth19 . It would thus not have 
been stricter than the Golden Rule. 
In sum, it is highly unlikely that the Debt-
reduction Rule would be relevant for a 
eurozone country with a debt level of less 
                                                 
17 The Debt-reduction Rule is based on average 
evolutions during three years. However, the 
numerical rule can be disregarded in case of a 
cyclical economic slowdown. In practice, growth 
would thus have to be below 2.6% for at least four 
years. 
18 From 1992 to 1994, Finland’s nominal GDP 
decreased by 2% per year on average. Recessions 
would also imply that other fiscal norms, including 
the Golden Rule, are not applied in a strict sense. 
19 Article 2(2) of Regulation 1467/1997 
(consolidated version). 
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than 100% of GDP. This is the case even for 
countries with prolonged periods of low 
growth. 
Besides low growth, high public debt could 
potentially result in the Debt-reduction Rule 
being more restrictive than the Golden Rule. 
Due to the financial and economic crisis, 
elevated public debt has become more 
common in the EU. Six eurozone countries 
are even set to have debt levels of more than 
100% of GDP in 2013 (see Table 1). 
Table 1: Gross Public Debt-to-GDP in 2013 
Country Debt-to-GDP 
Belgium 101% 
France 104% 
Greece 184% 
Ireland 122% 
Italy 127% 
Portugal 124% 
Source: OECD Economic Outlook 
December 2011 
Even for countries with debt-to-GDP 
around 120%, it would only require a three 
per cent nominal growth in order for the 
Golden Rule to be more stringent than the 
Debt-reduction Rule. If we take into account 
an average price increase of 1.8%, this 
implies 1.1% real economic growth. Such 
nominal growth is still remarkably low. 
Besides the specific cases of Finland and 
Germany discussed above, only two other 
eurozone countries had exactly one drawn-
out episode of average nominal growth 
falling below 3% of GDP during the period 
1992-200820. In all other eurozone countries, 
average nominal growth did not fall below 
                                                 
20 Austria’s nominal was 2.6% on average in the 
period 2002-2004, while France’s economy grew 
only 2.7 per cent in nominal terms in the period 
1993-1997. 
3% for more than two consecutive years21. 
Therefore, it seems highly improbable that 
the Debt-reduction Rule would be relevant 
for countries with a debt level as high as 
120% of GDP. 
Even if a country’s debt is 150% of GDP, 
the Debt-reduction Rule would only be 
relevant if average nominal growth fell below 
3.4%. Given an average price increase of 
1.8%, real growth would then have to fall 
below 1.6%. This is still rather slow 
economic growth, but somewhat less 
improbable. However, Greece is currently the 
only country in the EU with a debt-to-GDP 
level of more than 150% of GDP. 
Furthermore, Greece’s debt burden is likely 
to diminish due to a restructuring of its 
debt22. 
In the very rare case that a country would 
have both high debt and sustained lacklustre 
growth, it is still not sure whether the Debt-
reduction Rule will be more stringent than 
the Golden Rule. EU legislation allows for a 
more flexible interpretation of the Debt-
reduction Rule when the primary balance 
(which excludes interest expenditure) 
suggests so. Highly indebted countries 
typically have significant interest payments. 
Their primary balance will thus be in a major 
surplus if the actual deficit would be only 
0.5% of GDP. In practice, this means that 
the Debt-reduction Rule is likely to be 
                                                 
21 Ameco database and own calculations. 
22 The fact that the Debt-reduction Rule can apply 
for countries with very high debt in fact signals the 
inappropriateness of the rule for such countries. 
The Golden Rule is already very demanding, so we 
can wonder whether stricter requirements are a wise 
thing to impose. See: MAYSTADT, P., keynote 
speech at EGMONT-CCECRB expert seminar 
“The Financial and Economic Crisis: Overcoming 
the Shortcomings of the European Framework”, 6 
December 2010. 
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disregarded if highly indebted low-growth 
countries meet the Golden Rule. 
3. EU fiscal norms as safety net for 
the Golden Rule  
As has been argued above, EU fiscal norms 
will be less strict than the national Golden 
Rule in the vast majority of situations. The 
importance of EU fiscal norms will, as a 
consequence, diminish considerably. 
However, this does not render them 
completely irrelevant.  
The function of EU fiscal norms will change. 
In future, these fiscal norms are likely to 
serve as a safety net in case a national Golden 
Rule proves ineffective. Indeed, for several 
reasons, the latter cannot be excluded.  
Ineffectiveness could be due to difficulties in 
putting the Golden Rule into practice. An 
evaluation of whether a Member State meets 
the Golden Rule is based on presumed future 
growth. The fact that this is uncertain could 
render the Golden Rule rather difficult to 
apply. It can furthermore be challenging to 
make abstraction of temporary fiscal 
measures. 
It would be more damaging if the Golden 
Rule were deliberately diluted by a Member 
State – as occurred with the Stability and 
Growth Pact. Given the fact that eurozone 
countries preferably are to enshrine the 
Golden rule in their constitutions, manifest 
disrespect seems less likely than was the case 
for the Stability and Growth Pact. Yet, more 
subtle ways of circumventing the Golden 
Rule are conceivable. 
Eurozone countries could, for instance, 
overestimate future growth or apply the 
exceptions to the Golden Rule in an 
excessively flexible manner. Here, the 
Commission and eurozone peers are to play a 
crucial role in correcting overly rosy growth 
forecasts and ensuring the correct application 
of the Golden Rule. Nonetheless, whether 
this will be successful remains to be seen.  
In case the Golden Rule is not effective, be it 
due to practical difficulties or manifest 
disrespect, EU-level fiscal norms would step 
in. They would then offer ways to require 
budgetary actions by the country. EU norms 
are hence to become a safeguard to national 
Golden Rules. If, on the other hand, the 
Golden Rules prove successful, EU fiscal 
norms would become very much a side issue. 
4. Too strict a Golden Rule? 
As the successful introduction of the Golden 
Rule would overturn current fiscal rules in 
the eurozone, it is important to consider its 
consequences. However, a debate to this 
effect among eurozone leaders largely seems 
to be missing. 
The fact that Golden Rules would 
overshadow the current fiscal norms is 
already a clear indication of the Rule’s 
stringency. The Golden Rule implies that all 
eurozone countries whose debt is not 
significantly below 60% have to reduce their 
debt-to-GDP permanently and swiftly. 
Efforts would even have to be more far-
reaching than the fiscal consolidation that 
Belgium undertook after 1993 (see Figure 2). 
Of course, as the Golden Rule allows for a 
gradual move towards the 0.5% target, the 
Belgian fiscal consolidation would probably 
not have been sanctioned. 
Yet, achieving such a performance under 
current circumstances seems even more 
difficult than was the case then, as Belgium 
achieved its fiscal consolidation thanks to 
international economic growth and 
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decreasing interest rates. Both of these 
beneficial factors are likely to be much less 
pronounced in future recovery. For this 
reason, it is probable that such fiscal 
consolidation will not be feasible in some 
countries. This makes it highly controversial 
to legally require fiscal consolidation to an 
extent that outclasses Belgium’s applauded 
performance. 
Even for countries that can abide by the 
Golden Rule, it is doubtful whether the Rule 
is desirable from an economic point of view. 
Again referring to Belgium, it is clear that the 
demanded level of fiscal rigour risks 
undercutting public investments23. In the 
period 1992-2008, public investment in 
Belgium has been markedly below the 
eurozone average (1.7% of GDP versus 2.6% 
in the eurozone). 
The Golden Rule’s emphasis on fiscal rigour 
can lead to a neglect of Europe’s other long-
                                                 
23 See also: IMF, 2004, Public Investment and Fiscal 
Policy. 
term challenges. Aging, infrastructure and the 
shift towards a green economy (R&D, smart 
power grids, renewable energy, etc.) are all 
likely to require huge public investments in 
the coming years. The strong and continued 
rigour imposed by the Golden Rule is likely 
to crowd out much-needed investments. A 
Golden Rule that takes public investments 
and a country’s debt-to-GDP level into 
account seems more appropriate24. 
In spite of these doubts, the Golden Rule is 
to be enshrined in national law, as well as in 
an international treaty. This makes it most 
difficult to change the Golden Rule in future. 
If the Golden Rule turns out to be a 
suboptimal rule, eurozone leaders could end 
up with few options. They can adhere to the 
Golden Rule and would hence be forced into 
counterproductive policies. Alternatively, 
they could choose not to abide by their 
                                                 
24 This was already recognised by the Commission 
in 1990. See: Commission of the European 
Communities, 1990, Economic and Monetary 
Union. SEC (90) 1659. 
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Golden Rule, and thus turn both their 
national law and the Intergovernmental 
Treaty into a mere scrap of paper. 
Conclusion 
A successful introduction of Golden Rules in 
eurozone countries’ national legislation will 
overturn the EU’s fiscal setting. The Golden 
Rules will effectively determine the future 
fiscal discipline to which eurozone countries 
have to adhere. The role of EU-level fiscal 
norms will then decrease considerably. 
As was demonstrated in this paper, EU 
norms will only rarely require more fiscal 
discipline than the national Golden Rules. 
This would concern specific cases, such as a 
significant fiscal expansion during a 
pronounced economic downturn (while not a 
recession), or periods when a country itself 
commits to lower budget deficits. For 
countries with both genuinely high debt and 
lacklustre growth, EU norms could, in rare 
situations, also be more stringent. In all other 
situations, i.e. the vast majority, the Golden 
Rule will easily surpass EU-level norms. 
EU fiscal norms will therefore have a 
different function than before. They will 
serve to counter the inadequacy of a specific 
Golden Rule. If a Golden Rule proves 
impracticable or is diluted by a eurozone 
country, EU fiscal norms can step in to 
restrict the country’s deficits. In the 
eurozone, EU fiscal norms will therefore 
evolve from their current normative function 
into a safety net – only to apply when a 
Golden Rule proves defective. 
The stringency of the Golden Rule compared 
to EU fiscal norms raises questions about the 
soundness of its design. These questions are 
especially pressing as the Golden Rule is to 
be anchored firmly in national and 
international law. Eurozone leaders should 
therefore carefully consider whether the 
short-term signal they are seeking to give the 
financial markets will not result in more long-
term harm. Redefining the Golden Rule, so 
that it takes into account public investments 
and debt-to-GDP levels is still possible. But 
time for such changes is running out. 
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